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Abstract
When Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (LBHI) sought Chapter 11 protection, the more than
6,000 counterparties with which its subsidiaries had entered into over 900,000 over-thecounter (OTC) derivatives transactions faced the question of how best to respond to protect
their interests. The existence of standardized documentation developed by the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) for entering into such transactions meant that the
counterparties likely thought that they were dealing with a well-defined and robust set of
options in answering this question. Yet, in practice, the resolution of Lehman’s OTC
derivatives portfolio ended up being less orderly than the existence of standardized
documentation might have suggested it would be. This case explores: (1) whether the default
provisions contained in the Master Agreement played any meaningful role in Lehman
Brothers’ bankruptcy and its outcome, (2) whether changes should be made to the Master
Agreement to reduce the systemic risk associated with derivatives transactions, and (3) how
attempts to create global certainty through the use of standardized agreements can be
thwarted by the operation of local laws.

_____________________________________________________________________
This case study is one of eight Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) cases modules considering the
Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy:
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy A: Overview
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy B: Risk Limits and Stress Tests
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy C: Managing the Balance Sheet Through the Use of Repo 105
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy D: The Role of Ernst & Young
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy E: The Effects on Lehman’s U.S. Broker-Dealer
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy F: Introduction to the ISDA Master Agreement
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy G: The Special Case of Derivatives
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy H: The Global Contagion
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises.
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Introduction

When Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (LBHI) sought Chapter 11 protection on September
15, 2008, in the largest bankruptcy proceeding in United States history, the more than 6,000
counterparties with which its subsidiaries had entered into over 900,000 over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives transactions faced the question of how best to respond to protect their
interests. The existence of standardized documentation developed by the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) for entering into such transactions meant that the
counterparties likely thought that they were dealing with a well-defined and robust set of
options in answering this question. Under both the 1992 and 2002 versions of the ISDA
Master Agreement (referred to herein, together with the schedules, documents and other
confirming evidence that accompany it, as the Master Agreement), Lehman’s bankruptcy
filing created an Event of Default that gave non-defaulting counterparties the right to
terminate derivatives transactions and seek close-out payment of any amounts owed, while
seizing any collateral previously provided in support of such obligations. Alternatively,
counterparties could, according to the Master Agreement, elect not to terminate the
transactions but refrain from making payments to Lehman while it remained in bankruptcy.
Yet, in practice, the resolution of Lehman’s OTC derivatives portfolio ended up being less
orderly than the existence of standardized documentation might have suggested it would be.
The wave of terminations that followed the bankruptcy filing, coupled with shortcomings in
the methodologies adopted by the Master Agreement for calculating amounts owed on early
termination, resulted in what some believe was a significant loss of value to the Lehman
bankruptcy estate. Furthermore, the operation of local bankruptcy law in jurisdictions such
as the United States prevented certain provisions of the Master Agreement from being
enforced, with the result that documentation intended to foster global certainty via
standardization produced diametrically opposed outcomes in different parts of the world.
Given that the Lehman bankruptcy appears to have been the first major test case for
litigation surrounding the enforcement of these provisions, the diametrically opposed
outcomes likely caught market participants unaware. In the wake of the Lehman bankruptcy
and how its effects were felt in its derivatives portfolio, there have been calls to overhaul
how the Master Agreement treats derivatives in bankruptcy, most significantly by placing
limits on the ability of non-defaulting counterparties to terminate transactions.
The remainder of the case is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
history of the Master Agreement. Section 3 outlines the main components and sections of the
current iteration of the Master Agreement. Section 4 discusses the controversial role played
by the Master Agreement’s default provisions in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, and
Section 5 concludes with a summary of the current status of efforts to overhaul the Master
Agreement to address this controversy.

Questions
1. Did the default provisions contained in the Master Agreement play any meaningful
role in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and its outcome?
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2. Should changes be made to the Master Agreement to reduce the systemic risk
associated with derivatives transactions?
3. Can anything be done to ensure that attempts to create global certainty through the
use of standardized agreements are not thwarted by the operation of local laws?

2. History of the Master Agreement
In the era prior to the standardization of documentation for entering into OTC derivatives
transactions, parties to such transactions would typically use separate 15- to 25-page
agreements for each new transaction (Allen & Overy 2002). As the same parties began to
conduct repeated transactions with each other over time, rather than enter into new
agreements each time, parties would often establish a single base agreement that would be
supplemented by a short addendum setting forth the economic terms of a given transaction.
While this standardization saved the two parties from having to execute full-blown
agreements every time they wished to enter into a derivatives transaction with each other,
if one of the parties sought to conduct a transaction with a different counterparty, such
counterparty might demand a very different base agreement. Thus, participants in the OTC
derivatives market might still be in the position of having to negotiate and use multiple
agreements for entering into the same types of transactions.
In 1984, a group of derivatives dealers sought to address this issue by coming together to
develop standard terms for interest rate swaps, a common type of OTC derivative. A year
later, this resulted in the establishment of what was then known as the International Swap
Dealers Association to promulgate standardized documentation for use by OTC derivatives
market participants. Having since changed its name to the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (ISDA), the organization has become one of the largest global
financial trade associations, with over 800 membership institutions from more than 60
different countries, according to its website. While ISDA’s work on behalf of the industry has
expanded over time, at the heart of its mission is still the development of standardized
documentation for entering into OTC derivatives transactions.
ISDA’s first foray into standardization came shortly after it was founded, when in June 1985
it published the Code of Standard Wording, Assumptions and Provisions for Swaps (known
as the SWAPS Code) setting forth “a uniform vocabulary” for US-dollar-denominated interest
rate swaps. ISDA’s stated motivation in developing the SWAPS Code was to address “concern
about the varied interpretations that might result if each market participant were
independently to arrive at its own meanings for the principal terms used in rate swaps”
(ISDA 1985, iv). The SWAPS Code thus provided standardized meanings for terms commonly
used in swaps transactions, defining everything from New York Banking Day to LIBOR to
Early Termination Date.
ISDA soon followed a 1986 edition of the SWAPS Code with its first two standard form
agreements: the 1987 Interest Rate and Currency Exchange Agreement for single currency
and multiple currency interest rate and currency swaps, and the 1987 Interest Rate Swap
Agreement for US-dollar-denominated interest rate swaps. These were full-blown

139

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 1 Iss. 1

agreements that parties could use to document transactions in the derivatives covered.
Addenda published by ISDA between 1989 and 1991 expanded the types of derivatives
covered by the agreements.
The documents that ultimately became what we think of today when we refer to ISDA
standard documentation first appeared in 1992 with the release of the 1992 ISDA Master
Agreement. Featuring updates to the original standard form agreements developed during
the 1980s, the 1992 Master Agreement in fact consists of two separate contracts—a Multicurrency, Cross-Border Master Agreement for transactions between parties located in
different jurisdictions and/or transactions involving different currencies and a Local
Currency, Single Jurisdiction Master Agreement for transactions between parties located in
the same jurisdiction and transactions involving one currency. With the exception of
provisions tied to the differences in the currencies and jurisdictions involved, these two
agreements are otherwise identical.
The late 1990s were a period of financial turmoil that exposed certain weaknesses in the
1992 Master Agreement, particularly around its default and early termination provisions.
These weaknesses included delays in the ability to designate an event of default and difficulty
in employing the methodology used for calculating payments upon early termination in
periods of market stress. Following the Asian currency crisis in 1997 and the Russian debt
default and issues surrounding Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, ISDA saw a need to
adjust the 1992 Master Agreement “to reflect the lessons learned from those experiences
and to incorporate some of the changes that occurred in market practice after 1992” (ISDA
2003, i). The result was the introduction of the 2002 Master Agreement, which also
combined the two agreements of the 1992 Master Agreement into one. Except as discussed
in more detail below with respect to the calculation of amounts owed on early termination,
the 1992 Master Agreement and the 2002 Master Agreement are essentially one and the
same from the standpoint of the issues raised by the Lehman bankruptcy and are thus
referred to together as the Master Agreement for purposes of this case.

3. Summary of the Current Master Agreement
A fully executed Master Agreement consists of not one document, but several. The Master
Agreement itself sets forth the terms that will be applicable to all the transactions the parties
enter into pursuant to it and allows only for the insertion of the parties’ names and the date
of execution. A separate Schedule to the Master Agreement (the Schedule) allows the parties
to customize the Master Agreement by, among other things, further defining terms contained
in the Master Agreement and selecting which optional terms will be applicable. For example,
the Master Agreement allows the parties to designate Credit Support Providers that will act
as guarantors of their respective obligations. The Schedule is the document the parties would
use to make this designation. The parties would also use the Schedule to establish things like
whether or not an optional term like Automatic Early Termination will apply, whether or not
certain optional tax representations apply, and under which jurisdiction’s laws the Master
Agreement will be construed. Additionally, definitional booklets set forth defined terms
applicable to specific types of derivatives transactions. The use of the Schedule to do things

140

The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy F: Introduction to the ISDA Master Agreement

McNamara and Metrick

like designating Credit Support Providers can become critical in the context of the
bankruptcy of an organization with a complex corporate structure, as discussed in more
detail below. However, in many cases the optional terms that can be selected using the
Schedule are not essential to the functioning of the Master Agreement but are rather a
reflection of the parties’ preferences for how their transactions will be governed.
The Master Agreement as customized by the Schedule and further defined by the definitional
booklets lays out the terms that will govern the specific transactions entered into by the
parties. These specific transactions, in turn, are documented using confirmations outlining
the economic terms of a given transaction. The intended sequence is the execution of a
Master Agreement, followed by one or more such confirmations, but as a practical matter,
sometimes parties exchange confirmations documenting a specific transaction and then go
back and execute a Master Agreement (ISDA 2003, 1).
Figure 1 provides a brief summary of the main sections of the Master Agreement. Master
Agreement provisions that are especially noteworthy in the context of the Lehman
bankruptcy and systemic risk will be discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this module.

Figure 1: Main Sections of the Master Agreement

Source: Project Editor Notes.
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Master Agreement Default Positions and the Lehman Brothers
Bankruptcy

Master Agreement Default Provisions
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (LBHI) sought Chapter 11
protection, initiating the largest bankruptcy proceeding in United States history. Among the
myriad of consequences flowing from this filing was the triggering of default provisions
related to most (but, significantly, not all) of the 930,000 derivatives transactions Lehman
then had outstanding pursuant to 6,120 separate Master Agreements in its US estate.4 Under
Section 5(a)(vii) of the Master Agreement, a bankruptcy filing by a party to the Master
Agreement or a Credit Support Provider of that party constitutes an Event of Default with
respect to such party. The occurrence of such an Event of Default gives the non-defaulting
counterparty the right to, among other things, terminate the Master Agreement and seek
close-out payment of any amounts owed, while seizing any collateral previously provided in
support of such obligations. Importantly, unless the parties have selected the optional
Automatic Early Termination provisions contained in the Schedule, this early termination
right may or may not be exercised by the non-defaulting counterparty, in its sole discretion.
Significantly, the ability of Lehman counterparties to terminate derivatives transactions
following the Chapter 11 filing was a function not only of the provisions of the Master
Agreement, but also of the US Bankruptcy Code. Under the Code, in a typical bankruptcy case,
the filing of a Chapter 11 petition would trigger an automatic stay that would, among other
things, prevent the termination of agreements and the seizing of related collateral,
notwithstanding the expressed provisions of those agreements. Additionally, the debtor
generally would be entitled to select which agreements to assume going forward and which
to reject.
However, in 2005 the US Congress adopted expansive “safe harbor” provisions that enable
most derivatives transactions to avoid key provisions of the Code such as the automatic stay.
The ostensible reason for adopting these safe harbor provisions was to reduce systemic risk.
According to ISDA, “[i]f [the ability to terminate transactions and net them out] in insolvency
is not enforceable in a jurisdiction, a liquidator might pursue payment on transactions with
positive value while disclaiming those with negative value. The primary concern with such
‘cherry-picking’ is that [the] inability to terminate and net the transactions increases the risk
of a chain of interrelated defaults, that is, systemic risk” (ISDA 2009). Seeking to avoid such
risk, Congress largely exempted derivatives transactions from provisions of the Code that
would prevent such close-out netting. As a result, unlike other parties to the Lehman
bankruptcy, those in derivatives transactions were (for the most part) able to terminate
contracts and seize collateral.

_____________________________________________________________________
“The exact total number of Lehman’s derivatives trades and contracts at the time of bankruptcy remains
unclear. Reports by the Lehman estate variously put the number of trades at 906,000, 930,000, and 1,178,000
and the number of contracts at 6,120, 6,340, and 6,355 (Fleming and Sarkar 2014, 11, Fn 20).
4
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The option of designating Credit Support Providers to be included in the Master Agreement
default provision is extremely significant because, given the complex corporate structures of
many financial institutions, agreements are often signed with subsidiaries, while the intent
remains to contract with the corporate parent. The specific corporate entity with which a
counterparty is transacting may not file for bankruptcy at the same time as the struggling
corporate parent. If the parties have not agreed that the corporate parent is designated a
Credit Support Provider, the counterparty would be unable to terminate the Master
Agreement until such time as the specific corporate entity that is party to the agreement files
for bankruptcy. For example, Lehman Brothers conducted the vast majority of its US
derivatives business through a subsidiary known as Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.
(LBSF) which itself did not declare bankruptcy until several weeks after the LBHI filing.
(Note: Lehman Brothers also conducted derivatives transactions outside of the United States
through its Lehman Brothers International (Europe) subsidiary.) For transactions in which
LBHI was a named Credit Support Provider for LBSF, this gap in time was not an issue—the
bankruptcy filing of LBHI triggered the default provisions of Master Agreements entered into
by LBSF.
However, as noted above, it is not uncommon for parties to engage in a derivatives
transaction pursuant to a deemed generic Master Agreement, intending to put a specific
Master Agreement into place after the fact. If this has not yet been accomplished at the time
of a bankruptcy, no Credit Support Partners have been agreed to and therefore no Event of
Default has occurred unless the transacting entity itself has filed for bankruptcy. In the case
of Lehman Brothers, it has been reported that there were counterparties (although likely not
that many) who found themselves in exactly this position, unable to terminate their
transactions until LBSF’s filing on October 3, 2008 (Parker and McGarry 2008).
Payment Provisions on Termination
Notwithstanding the existence of some counterparties who may have been initially unable
to terminate their transactions, by November 13, 2008, approximately 733,000 of the
930,000 Lehman derivatives transactions outstanding had in fact been terminated according
to a bankruptcy court filing by Lehman. For these terminated transactions, the question then
became the amount of any payments owed upon termination. Here, the difference between
the 1992 Master Agreement and the 2002 Master Agreement becomes significant.
Under the 1992 Master Agreement, payments upon termination are based either on the
“Market Quotation” or “Loss” approach. The Market Quotation approach requires the nondefaulting party to obtain at least three quotations from leading derivatives dealers on the
amounts they would expect to pay or receive to enter into a replacement transaction with
the non-defaulting party. If three quotations are not available, if the quotations result in a
commercial unreasonable result (as determined in good faith by the non-defaulting party),
or if the parties have already so chosen in the Master Agreement, the Loss approach will
apply. This methodology requires the non-defaulting party to make a good faith
determination of its total losses and costs (or gains) stemming from the termination.
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Each of these approaches has significant drawbacks. While potentially providing a more
objective outcome, the Market Quotation approach can break down in times of market stress
when quotations from leading derivatives dealers are not available or result in commercially
unreasonable results as was reported to have happened in the wake of the Lehman
bankruptcy. The Loss result does not depend on the existence of dealer quotations, but is
highly subjective and involves a greater risk of manipulation by the non-defaulting party.
In an attempt to address these drawbacks, the 2002 Master Agreement replaced the Market
Quotation and Loss approaches with a Close-Out Amount approach. (See Figure 2.) This new
approach was intended to provide greater flexibility and requires the non-defaulting party
to act in good faith and use commercially reasonable procedures to reach a commercially
reasonable determination of the losses or gains resulting from replacing the terminated
transaction. This may include using one or more of firm or indicative quotations and/or
Figure 2: Methods for Determining Amounts Owed on Termination

Source: ISDA Master Agreement.

relevant market data such as rates, prices, yields, yield curves, volatilities, and correlations,
whether from third parties or internal sources. Thus, the Close-Out Amount is in many ways
a hybrid of the Market Quotation and Loss approaches, requiring the non-defaulting party to
use more objective sources of information than required under the Loss approach, but not
necessarily dealer quotations when such quotations cannot be obtained due to market
stress.
The specific approaches applicable to a given transaction depend on the version of the
Master Agreement pursuant to which the transaction was entered into, and the introduction
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of the 2002 Master Agreement neither replaced the 1992 Master Agreement then in effect
nor required parties to use the 2002 Master Agreement instead of the 1992 Master
Agreement when entering into new Master Agreements going forward. Thus, although
Lehman’s bankruptcy occurred in 2008, many of the derivatives transactions terminated in
the wake of the filing were governed by the 1992 Master Agreement, and counterparties
terminating derivative transactions were put in the unrealistic position of attempting to
obtain dealer quotations during a period of extreme market stress.
Particularly in light of the drawbacks associated with different approaches for how to
calculate payments due on the termination of derivatives transactions, the rush to terminate
following the Lehman bankruptcy may have resulted in a loss of value to the bankruptcy
estate in the form of inflated close-out payment demands and the fire-sale liquidation of
associated collateral, with systemic risk implications, in addition to the harm done to
Lehman. (For more information on the effect of derivatives terminations on the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy estate, see Wiggins, et al 2014G.)
While the wave of counterparties terminating their derivatives transactions pursuant to the
provisions of the Master Agreement may have created difficulties for Lehman, those
counterparties who opted not to terminate also posed a problem. Under Section 2(a)(iii) of
the Master Agreement, the obligation of a party to pay amounts owing as a result of a
derivatives transaction is conditioned on there being no continuing Event of Default with
respect to the other party. Thus, under a literal interpretation of the provisions of the Master
Agreement, a counterparty to an out-of-the-money derivatives transaction with a bankrupt
entity has the choice of either (a) exercising the right of early termination and paying the
bankrupt entity what is owed as a close-out payment, or (b) opting not to terminate the
transaction and refraining from making payment of any amounts owed for as long as the
entity remains in bankruptcy. (See Figure 3.)
Figure 3: Portion of Master Agreement

Source: ISDA Master Agreement.

A number of Lehman counterparties did in fact exercise this latter option, resulting in several
legal battles in which Lehman argued that, despite the plain language of Section 2(a)(iii), the
Master Agreement should not be interpreted as allowing counterparties to indefinitely
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refrain from making payment of amounts owed pursuant to non-terminated derivatives
transactions with Lehman. In London, a series of similar cases resulted in a determination
by a court that Section 2(a)(iii) is effective to suspend (but not terminate) payment
obligations of a non-defaulting party until such time as the default is cured, potentially
resulting in an indefinite suspension of such obligations (Lomas v. JFB Firth Rixson Inc.,
2012).
A similar fact pattern resulted in the opposite outcome in a US bankruptcy court in New York.
In December 2007, Lehman entered into an interest rate swap with Metavante Corporation,
pursuant to which the former agreed to pay the latter three-month LIBOR in exchange for
3.865% fixed on a notional amount of $600 million. When interest rates dropped, the LIBOR
payment owed by Lehman became less than the fixed payment owed by Metavante.
Metavante ended up with a net payment obligation of approximately $6 million as of May
2009, representing quarterly net interest payments that Metavante should have made in
November 2008 and February and May 2009. In refusing to make these payments,
Metavante relied on the language of Section 2(a)(iii), arguing that, because Lehman was in
bankruptcy, Metavante’s obligation to make payments under the Master Agreement was
suspended.
The court found that suspension of payments, although specifically provided for in the
Master Agreement, constitutes “an attempt to control property of the estate,” in violation of
the automatic stay provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code and that the safe harbors enacted
by Congress for derivatives transactions do not apply to suspending payment obligations (In
re: Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. 2009). Thus, in this instance, the provisions of local law
trumped the explicit language of the Master Agreement, and a document intended to create
global certainty via standardization produced diametrically opposed outcomes in two of the
leading financial capitals of the world. In both London and New York, the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy appears to have provided the impetus for the first major litigation over the
enforceability of Section 2(a)(iii), with the result that the diametrically opposed outcomes
likely caught market participants unaware. Figure 4 summarizes the various outcomes that
would result from a counterparty’s decision to terminate or not terminate a derivatives
transaction with Lehman following its bankruptcy filing.
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Figure 4: Derivatives Termination Decision Matrix for Lehman Brothers’ Counterparty

Source: Author’s Notes.

5. Master Agreement Reform
Both the rush to terminate derivatives transactions with Lehman following its bankruptcy
filing and the uncertainty regarding whether out-of-the-money counterparties could refrain
from making payments pursuant to Section 2(a)(iii) have resulted in calls for an overhaul of
how the Master Agreement treats Events of Default and early terminations. In February
2009, ISDA published the ISDA Close-out Amount Protocol, which allows parties to amend
the terms of existing 1992 Master Agreements to adopt the Close-out Amount approach
instead of the Market Quotation and Loss approaches. By making this option available to
parties to 1992 Master Agreements, ISDA hopes to encourage migration to the Close-out
Amount approach to avoid the difficulties that were caused by seeking to determine
termination payments based on dealer quotations in periods of extreme market stress.
In November 2013, the Bank of England, the German Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority, the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Swiss Financial Market
Supervisory Authority wrote a joint letter to ISDA requesting several changes to the Master
Agreement to address “the risk of disorderly termination of derivatives contracts,
particularly in the cross-border resolution context, arising out of the exercise of termination
rights following the commencement of an insolvency or resolution action.” Calling this risk a
“key challenge” in the development of resolution strategies to “resolve global systemically
important financial institutions in a manner that reduces the risk of global financial
instability while minimizing moral hazard,” the regulators proposed amending the Master
Agreement to provide for a short-term suspension of termination rights and certain other
remedies such as transfer or the appointment of a restructuring agent in the event of an
insolvency. The purpose of such amendments would be to “allow, where the operative law
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permits, the exercise of all applicable types of resolution powers, especially the transfer of
the derivatives contracts and/or associated guarantee obligations to a third party, including
a bridge entity, on an expedited basis, the bail-in of a failing institution through the writedown of liabilities, or the conversion of liabilities into equity.” (Emphasis added.)
Significantly, the regulators acknowledged that any amendments to the Master Agreement
to address the issue of disorderly termination would only be effective to the extent such
amendments are not precluded by local law, as the court’s decision in Metavante illustrates.
Thus, a real solution to the problem might require not only updates to the standardized
documentation used to enter into transactions, but also changes to the laws of individual
countries.
One area where there have been calls for changes to local law is the treatment of derivatives
under bankruptcy codes. As noted above, the only reason the early termination provisions
of the Master Agreement are even enforceable in a jurisdiction such as the United States is
because the U.S. Bankruptcy Code contains safe harbors specifically exempting most
derivatives transactions from key Code provisions that would otherwise act to bar
terminations and the seizing of collateral. Some commentators have argued that these safe
harbors enabled a run on troubled banks such as Lehman in the form of mass terminations
of derivatives transactions and have called for their repeal. (See, for example, Lubben 2010.)
Adding to the calls for an overhaul of the Master Agreement are the provisions of the DoddFrank Act and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) that change how
derivatives are regulated in the United States and Europe, respectively. With Dodd-Frank
and EMIR mandating, among other things, the clearing of certain derivatives, risk mitigation
techniques for uncleared derivatives, and business conduct and documentation standards,
ISDA has been in the process of adopting protocols that enable market participants to
conform existing Master Agreements to the new requirements (Servidio et al. 2014). How
the Master Agreement functions in this new era of clearinghouses and risk mitigation will be
a subject of considerable interest going forward.
In response to calls for reform, on November 4, 2014, ISDA published its 2014 Resolution
Stay Protocol. Among the features of this reform are provisions requiring parties who adopt
the Protocol to adhere to the “special resolution regimes” (such as Title II of Dodd-Frank),
adopted to give regulators the ability to resolve failing banks in an orderly fashion. These
regimes typically include a short stay of up to two business days on terminations following
a bankruptcy in order to give regulators time to take action such as transferring failing banks’
rights and assets to another entity. Particularly with cross-border transactions, it was not
entirely clear whether the special resolution regime requirements of a given jurisdiction
would bind parties not within the jurisdiction. The Protocol thus seeks to have parties agree
contractually to be bound. A further provision of the Protocol deals specifically with the US
Bankruptcy Code, restricting the counterparties of non-bankrupt affiliates of insolvent US
financial holding companies from exercising cross-default provisions (ISDA 2014).
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In connection with the introduction of the Protocol, eighteen major global banks agreed to
adopt it effective January 1, 2015.5 Further compliance is expected to occur as a result of
regulators barring financial institutions within their jurisdictions from entering into
derivatives transactions with counterparties who have not adopted the Protocol.
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